Unprincipled? The British government\u27s pragmatic approach to the precautionary principle by Patterson A & Gray T
Newcastle University e-prints  
Date deposited:  5th April 2013 (uploaded 20th October 2013) 
Version of file:  Author final 
Peer Review Status: Peer reviewed 
Citation for item: 
Patterson A, Gray T. Unprincipled? The British government's pragmatic approach to the 
precautionary principle. Environmental Politics 2012, 21(3), 432-450.  
Further information on publisher website: 
http://www.tandfonline.com  
Publisher’s copyright statement: 
© Routledge, 2012 
"This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Environmental Politics 2012, 21(3), 
432-450. © Taylor & Francis, available online 
at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09644016.2012.671573."  
The definitive version of this article is available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2012.671573 
Always use the definitive version when citing.   
Use Policy: 
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced and given to third parties in any format or medium, 
without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not for profit 
purposes provided that: 
 A full bibliographic reference is made to the original source 
 A link is made to the metadata record in Newcastle E-prints 
 The full text is not changed in any way. 
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the 
copyright holders. 
 
 Robinson Library, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle upon Tyne.  
NE1 7RU.  Tel. 0191 222 6000 
 1 
Is the British government’s pragmatic approach to the precautionary principle in three 
environmental policy areas – OPs, GM crops and BSE – unprincipled or principled? 
 
Alan Patterson and Tim Gray* 
 
School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK 
 
This is an evaluation of the pragmatic way in which the British government makes use of 
the precautionary principle (PP) in its environmental policy decision-making. We focus on 
the question of whether the government’s pragmatic approach to the PP is unprincipled or 
principled. We examine three cases in which scientific evidence played a central role – 
organophosphorous pesticides (OPs) in sheep dips; genetically-modified (GM) crops; and 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE: so-called ‘mad cow’ disease). These cases were 
chosen because they were particularly difficult to resolve scientifically, and gave rise to 
heated debates over the merits of the PP approach to environmental policy. The 
government’s decisions were, respectively, to reject the PP in the case of OPs; to adopt a 
strong version of the PP in the case of GM crops; and to adopt a weak version of the PP in 
the case of BSE. Our evaluation is that these decisions were not unprincipled, but 
principled, in that they applied a consistent and coherent approach to the PP based on the 
ethical principle of ‘circumstances’. We show how such an approach is justifiable, by 
drawing on the pragmatic political philosophy of Edmund Burke.   
 
Keywords: precautionary principle; sound science; environmental policy; uncertainty; 
environmental risk. 
 
Introduction 
 
The British government, like other governments, relies heavily on scientific advisors in much 
of its policy decision-making. Having the authority and status of scientists to endorse its policies 
provides a government with probably the most important kind of support it could have. But rarely can 
scientific advisors provide a government with categorical evidence on difficult issues, because much of 
the relevant data is incomplete or inconclusive, and a significant degree of uncertainty is the norm 
rather than the exception. Where there is uncertainty, there are two alternative ways of proceeding: 
either 1) to wait until the evidence becomes conclusive that a problem does exist which requires 
governmental intervention (the sound science approach); or 2) to take immediate action in advance of 
conclusive evidence that there is a problem which requires governmental intervention, because if action  
is delayed until that evidence becomes available, it might be too late to prevent irreversible harm being 
done (the precautionary principle (PP) approach).    
Before the advent of the PP in Germany in the 1970s (Jordan and O’Riordan 1995: 57), the 
traditional response of the British government in conditions of uncertainty was to apply the sound 
science approach (McCormick 1991).  However, during the 1980s and 1990s, this attitude gradually 
changed as the government was -increasingly obliged to take account of the PP. Britain is bound by 
numerous EU directives and regulations which inscribe the PP in its environmental and health policy-
making, and as far back as 1990, the Government acknowledged precaution as one of five principles to 
guide its policies on the environment (DoE 1990: 34):  
 
given the environmental risks, we must act responsibly and be prepared to take 
precautionary action where it is justified…Where there are significant risks of damage to the 
environment the Government will be prepared to take precautionary action to limit the use of 
potentially dangerous materials or the spread of potentially dangerous pollutants, even where 
scientific knowledge is not conclusive, if the balance of likely costs and benefits justifies it 
(DoE 1990:11).  
 
However, critics claim that, unlike Germany, which has wholeheartedly embraced the PP 
(Boehmer-Christiansen 1994: 55), Britain’s embrace of it has been lukewarm, and that the British 
government only invokes the PP as a last resort, when it is strongly pressured by public opinion and/or 
the EU. The implication of this claim is that the British government is unprincipled or opportunistic in 
its approach to the PP, and that only when it embraces the PP as an ethical principle, will it achieve its 
professed goal of sustainable development:  
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the politics of precaution offer a profound critique of many of the ways in which the UK 
Government has managed its environmental affairs…Only when precaution tips the balance 
in favour of environmental well-being rather than material growth will the UK begin to 
make purposive steps in the direction of sustainable development (Jordan and O’Riordan 
1995: 79-80). 
 
In our view, such a charge is unconvincing, because it ignores the fact that the British 
government’s pragmatic approach to the PP already conforms to an ethical principle – the principle of 
‘circumstance’. In 1790, Edmund Burke (1790: 384) enunciated the principle of circumstance in his 
statement that 
 
Circumstances (which with some gentlemen pass for nothing) give in reality to every 
political principle its distinguishing colour and discriminating effect. The circumstances are 
what render every civil and political scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind.   
 
What Burke means is that principles cannot be understood, let alone approved of, in abstraction 
or in a vacuum: they are practical guides to action. A principle that is only good in theory is, for Burke, 
a bad principle: a good principle is one that works in practice - indeed, practice is the only test of the 
worth of a principle. For example, for Burke (1790: 384), although the principle of liberty is good in 
the abstract, whether it is good in practice depends on what people do with it:  
 
Abstractly speaking…liberty is good. [Yet] Is it because liberty in the abstract may be 
classed among the blessings of mankind, that I am…to congratulate a…murderer, who has 
broke prison, upon the recovery of his natural rights?...The effect of liberty to individuals is, 
that they may do what they please: we ought to see what it will please them to do before we 
risk congratulations, which may be soon turned into complaints.  
 
Applying Burke’s argument to the PP, we see that the principle of precaution, like the principle 
of liberty, may be good in theory, but it may not be good in practice – it all depends on the use to which 
it is put. This is a perfectly coherent and indeed, principled approach to environmental policy: 
circumstances will determine whether and how the PP is to be invoked and applied by the British 
government. The PP is one of a number of principles upon which the British government draws at 
various times to assist in its response to environmental issues, including the polluter pays principle; the 
principle of integrated pollution prevention control; the principle of proportionality, the principle of 
economic growth, and the principle of sound science. This is not an unprincipled approach to 
environmental policy: it is a meta-principled approach to make use of different principles when it 
judges them to be appropriate at different times and in different situations. Of particular relevance to 
the subject matter of this paper, is the way in which the UK government makes use of three such 
principles – sound science; weak PP; and strong PP – always choosing which one is most propitious for 
the issue at hand.  
We test this argument - that the British government’s approach to the PP is principled not 
unprincipled- by investigating British policy-making in three cases - organophosphorous pesticides 
(OPs) in sheep dips; genetically-modified (GM) crops; and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). 
These three case studies were chosen because they are significantly both similar and dissimilar. The 
similarities are threefold: first, they all impinge on human health; second, they all had periods of 
political salience; third, they all involve deep controversy over scientific evidence. The dissimilarities 
are fivefold: first, the OPs issue and the BSE issue have comparative long histories (over thirty years 
and 13 years respectively) whereas the GM issue is of comparatively recent origin. Second, the BSE 
affair is an example of a specific set of events which had a beginning and an end, unlike the OPs and 
GM issues, which continue to unfold. Third, the OPs and BSE issues affect a small number of known 
people, whereas the GM issue could potentially affect many, as well as the natural environment. 
Fourth, the damage done by OPs and BSE has already been inflicted, whereas the fears raised by GM 
crops relate largely to the future. Fifth, the OPs and BSE issues involved mainly one governmental 
department—the then Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF) - whereas the GM issue, 
because it is linked to the biotechnology industry, involved several government departments and 
agencies, including the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Department of Health (DoH), and 
the Office of Science and Technology. Therefore, the cases are sufficiently similar to raise common 
issues, but sufficiently dissimilar to yield general lessons. 
The main method of obtaining data for the three cases was the study of official and non-official 
documents, including Parliamentary Select Committee reports, government departmental reports (for 
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example, DEFRA’s GM Science Review Panel Report), and White Papers; scientific research reports 
from university departments; academic journal articles; and contemporary newspaper reports. This 
material was supplemented by 14 interviews, conducted with Members of Parliament; members of 
advisory committees; research scientists; and members of advocacy groups such as the OP Information 
Network and Green Alliance.  
In what follows, section 2 explains in more detail the contrasting notions of sound science and 
the precautionary principle.  Section 3 presents the results of the three case studies – OPs; GM crops; 
and BSE. Section 4 discusses these results to determine whether they reveal a principled or 
unprincipled approach to the PP. Section 5 is a conclusion, which summarises the paper’s findings and 
their implications. 
 
Sound science and the precautionary principle 
  
Sound science 
Although the term ‘sound science’ has not been adopted by the British government in official 
documentation, at the 1993 North Sea Interim Ministers Meeting, the then Minister for the 
Environment, Tim Yeo, referred to the need for decisions to be made on the basis of “sound science” 
(MacGarvin 1994: 74). The sound science approach to environmental and public health problems 
entails that policy-makers consult the appropriate scientific experts who search for causal links between 
a reported problem and the product or process allegedly causing the problem. Results are then reported 
back to government and decisions are based on the scientific recommendations. This approach assumes 
that unless a causal link exists between an activity, process, or product, and a harm can be scientifically 
demonstrated, then government will be right to refuse to take remedial action, because it could not 
justify public expenditure: ‘Unless and until a cause-effect relationship is proven, scientific advice is, 
usually, to do nothing’ (Carter and Lowe 2000: 182). Dryzek stated that the absence of conclusive 
scientific proof became the standard reason for the British government’s inaction on such major 
environmental pollution issues as ‘acid rain, carbon dioxide, chloroflurocarbons, coastal pollution and 
sludge dumping in the North Sea’ (Dryzek 1997 139). Moreover, the burden of proof of harm lay with 
the objectors to an activity, not with the persons engaged in the activity: objectors had to prove the 
producers guilty of harm; the producers did not have to prove their innocence. 
Sound science is founded on positivist norms which Merton (1973) has characterised as the 
principles of objectivity, verifiability, disinterestedness (no subjective judgements or financial interests 
are involved), and scepticism (it waits until the facts are known before making judgements). In this 
approach, scientific ‘methods are based primarily on deduction, experiments are replicable, theories are 
predictive, and the scientific endeavour is considered to be value-free’ (Barrett and Raffensperger 
1999: 110).  Sound science is ‘a powerful and neutral tool capable of predicting accurately risk and 
causality’ (Christoforou 2003: 208). Wolpert (1997: 21) claimed that ‘a key feature of science’ is that 
‘there is only one correct explanation for any set of phenomenon’.  Science, is therefore, ‘deemed to be 
“expert” knowledge and scientists are the “experts”’ (Barrett and Raffensperger 1999: 110), preventing 
non-scientists from challenging or reinterpreting claims labelled as “science”’ (Jasanoff 1990: 14).   
 
Precautionary principle 
However, the reputation of sound science was badly damaged by a series of well-publicised 
technological disasters during the 1970s and 1980s. Three Mile Island (1979), Bhopal (1984), Seveso 
(1976), Chernobyl (1987), and acid rain (1986) are all familiar examples of large-scale technological 
failures causing grave environmental degradation in recent years. According to Ulrich Beck, we are 
now living in a risk society: ‘The once highly praised sources of wealth (the atom, chemistry, genetic 
technology and so on) are transformed into unpredictable sources of danger’ (Beck 1992: 51). Despite 
the application of sound science, therefore, the increasing use of technology seems to produce a rapidly 
extending array of negative side effects.   
One response to these shortcomings of sound science is the PP. Here the emphasis is on taking 
action against a threat to human health and/or the environment, even where the evidence of the threat is 
not conclusive, because by the time that evidence becomes available, it might be too late to stop the 
threat. Indeed, proponents of the PP believe that in many cases, the required evidence may never 
become available, and that we have to resign ourselves to accepting the limits of scientific knowledge, 
because we live in a world of permanent uncertainty. Nevertheless, advocates of the PP claim that it 
has scientific credentials. For instance, for Greenpeace it is a ‘scientifically sound philosophy’ 
(Johnston and Simmonds 1990: 402). For Christoforou (2003: 205) the precautionary approach 
‘provides both substantive and procedural rationality to the politics of risk regulation’. Saunders (2004) 
called the PP ‘common sense’. For other commentators, the PP was more than simple common sense: it 
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was a moral principle, imposing an obligation on policy makers to take all necessary steps to protect 
human health and the natural environment. Moreover, the PP implied the reversal of the legal precept 
of “innocent until proven guilty”, since the onus of proof has shifted from the objector to prove that 
there is a threat of harm, to the producer to prove that there is not a threat.  
Many commentators distinguish between two versions of the PP – a stronger and a weaker 
version.  In its strongest formulation, preferred by ‘deep green’ NGOs and conservationists, the PP 
requires, first, absolute proof of safety before allowing new technologies to be adopted. Here the onus 
is placed on the polluters to prove beyond all doubt that his/her polluting activities will not damage the 
environment: that is, there has to be certainty that no harm will befall the environment if no 
intervention is made. Second, the strong version of the PP entails that whenever there is a perceived 
threat to humans or the environment, the perceived threatener must cease the threatening activity 
forthwith, irrespective of the socio- economic consequences. These features of the stronger version of 
the PP have led writers such as Sunstein to express some concern about the use of the PP (Sunstein 
2005: 4). In theory, taking the PP to such an extreme could justify ruining an economy if that was the 
price that had to be paid to save a single endangered animal species.   
By contrast, the weaker version of the PP, first, imposes a lesser evidential requirement on 
developers in proving that their activities do not harm humans or the environment (beyond reasonable 
doubt, rather than beyond all doubt); and second, allows evidence of negative socio-economic costs to 
be weighed against the positive environmental benefits of banning a harmful development. Such a 
weaker version of the precautionary principle was agreed in the Ministerial Declaration of the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (the “Earth Summit”) in Rio de Janeiro: ‘Where there 
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’ (UNCED 1993, emphasis 
added).  USCOP (2004: 36) described this as ‘a balanced precautionary approach, applying judicious 
and responsible management practices’ (emphasis in original). This is the idea of proportionality - that 
remedial measures should be tailored to a chosen level of protection. In this formulation, the focus is on 
the respective magnitudes of the threats and the responses: rather than simply saying there is 
uncertainty therefore we should not proceed, we are weighing up both the extent of that uncertainty and 
the impact of the consequent intervention (Christoforou 2003: 206). Of course, the weaker version of 
the PP leaves unanswered the questions of what is “reasonable doubt”; what are “cost-effective” 
measures; what are ‘judicious and responsible management practices’; and who should address these 
questions. Such questions highlight the indeterminacy of the PP, giving rise to critical judgements like 
that expressed by O’Riordan and Cameron (1994: 12, 21): ‘it is a rather shambolic concept, muddled in 
policy advice and subject to whims of international diplomacy and the unpredictable public mood over 
the true cost of sustainable living…there is neither an agreed yardstick, nor a consensus as to how it 
should be applied’. One of the PP’s conceptual conundrums, Whiteside (2006: 80) notes, has been 
pointed out by writers such as Cameron, Abouchar and Dupuy, who argue that the essence of the PP is 
its unconditionality, and so any attempt to dilute it by the notion of proportionality necessarily 
undermines it: ‘Proportionality…contradicts the very logic of precaution…What is a proportionate 
policy in relation to an unknown danger? Proportional to what? Doesn’t the proportionality of 
precautions depend entirely on whether catastrophic consequences occur – which is precisely what we 
do not know’.  
 
The Three Case Studies: OPs; GM Crops; and BSE 
 
In this section, we investigate whether the British government applied the sound science 
approach or the PP (either the weak PP or the strong PP) to three important policy problems in the area 
of public health and the environment. The first problem is organophosphorus pesticides in sheep dips. 
 
 OPs - organophosphorous pesticides in sheep dips 
This case study considers the problem of dipping sheep with solutions containing 
organophosphorus pesticides (OPs), and the efforts of farmers and their representatives to get the 
government to accept that it causes serious health problems for anyone using these products. Those 
efforts proved unsuccessful, however, as the government adopted a sound science approach because of 
the lack of evidence that OPs in sheep dips caused ill-health in farmers.     
Sheep are prone to skin parasites such as lice and sheep scab, and dipping is a practice 
designed to get rid of these parasites. OPs were introduced into sheep dip in the 1960s under various 
sheep scab orders, and farmers were expected to use a government-approved sheep dip (OPIN 1999).  
During the 1980s, about 40 million sheep on 18,765 farms were dipped once or twice a year (PAN UK, 
undated). Exposure of humans to OPs can be by absorption through the skin during handling the 
 5 
concentrate; or when applying the diluted OP dip; or from inhalation of droplets if using a spraying 
method; or through oral exposure—by operators eating food after dipping without having washed their 
hands. 
Farmers in the UK and their families have for many decades complained that sheep dip 
containing OPs has affected their health, causing headaches, flu-like symptoms, blurred vision, 
depression, exhaustion, short-term memory loss and confusion (Sigmund 2003). Campaigners 
estimated that in 1990 there were up to 2,500 farmers who could be suffering from the use of OPs in 
sheep dip (Walker 2001: 3).  OP Information Network compiled a list of 800 victims of sheep dip, 
including 25 children of dippers who have learning difficulties and physical abnormalities (Brown 
2000). At a seminar organized by the National Farmers Union and the British Medical Association on 2 
June 1995, many farmers and doctors called for an immediate moratorium on OP dip and compensation 
for those whose health had been affected. An environmental journalist (Brown 2000) recorded that 
despite these and other reports that OPs were dangerous to health, the government refused to ban them.    
Three regulatory committees - the Veterinary Products Committee (VCP); the Committee on 
the Safety of Medicines (CSM), and the Committee on Toxicity of Chemicals in Food, Consumer 
Products and the Environment (COT) - all advised the government that ill-health from prolonged low-
level exposure to OP sheep dip remained unproven, so that on the basis of current knowledge no 
general withdrawal of OPs from the market was necessary, though they emphasised the need for further 
research. The government accepted the line argued by the Pesticides Safety Directorate that risk to 
humans can be minimised by following prescribed instructions (Chemistry and Industry 1996).    
The government’s response to the OPs problem was, therefore, sound science: because there 
was no firm evidence that properly conducted sheep dipping with OPs caused human ill-health, there 
was no justification for banning OP dips. All of the studies into exposure to sheep dip shared two 
important conclusions: 1) that there is a hazard attached to working with OP substances; but 2) that 
there is no definitive evidence of a causal link between OPs and ill-health. These are ideal conditions 
for the application of the PP, as an occupational and environmental health professional, Andrew 
Watterson (a Professor of Occupational Health) argued. He believed that the data reviewed by policy-
makers had increased over the years; was of good quality; consistently suggested dangers in the use of 
OP sheep dip; and provided a compelling case for the application of the PP (quoted in Fairclough 2003: 
436). But the British government did not agree, and stuck to its sound science approach, which it 
regarded as validated by its scientific advisors. After each piece of research on OPs was considered by 
government advisory bodies, they noted uncertainties in the evidence; questioned the methodologies 
used; and called for more research. Typically, COT used the sound science approach in looking at the 
chemical properties of OPs, accepting that they are toxic, but, finding no causal links, insisted that any 
problems could be avoided by the wearing of PPE as a preventive measure.  
Fairclough sees a sinister side to the government’s position, claiming that its scientific 
advisors have not been as disinterested as they ought to have been in conducting their evaluations of 
the evidence.  For example, Fairclough (2003: 110) found that of the 21 members of the VCP in 
1993/94, ‘nine declared they had undertaken consultancy work for pharmaceutical companies and 
nearly half of the Committee declared that they had received some form of research funding from 
pharmaceutical companies’. Similarly, Watterson (2003) believed that there were indirect pressures 
from industry, pointing out that a number of members of advisory committees had share-holdings in 
chemical companies. Moreover, it has been suggested that toxicological evidence presented at meetings 
could have had their meanings changed after being interpreted and recorded by civil servants 
(Fairclough 2003:110). Fairclough (2003: 15) also pointed out that the evaluation and interpretation of  
scientific data and the details of decisions on approvals were not fully available to the public: her own 
attempts to access such information from the Advisory Committee on Pesticides met with continuous 
refusals. So the government operated as a closed policy community in which the licensing and 
information on OP dips remained in-house, and peer review was inclusive to government experts and 
industry experts (Fairclough 2003: 105). During interviews and informal meetings carried out during 
research for this paper, similar allegations to those made by Fairclough were heard.   
In sum, on the OPs issue, the government maintained a sound science approach throughout, 
rejecting calls to adopt the PP. It based its sound science stance on the lack of conclusive scientific 
evidence of a causal link between OPs and human ill-health, and upon expert advice that proper usage 
of OPs would ensure the user’s safety. As the then Minister of State for the Environment, Jeff Rooker, 
stated: ‘If we are to ban or suspend use of OP sheep dip, I have to have a really good reason—one that 
is judge-proof, so some slick lawyer doesn’t run around the corner and unstitch what we have done’ 
(quoted in Miekle 1999). The message was that until there is proof that OP solutions are unsafe, they 
must be assumed to be safe. Yet that sound science stance was challenged by critics who argued that 
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the government’s scientific advisors were neither neutral nor transparent in their evaluation of the 
evidence, and that safety instructions failed to take into account everyday human behaviour.   
 
GM – genetically modified crops 
A very different story emerges from the controversy over GM crops, where the government 
initially adopted a sound science stance, but was forced by public opinion and the EU to implement the 
strong version of the PP. Unlike earlier crop breeding techniques, GM engineering allows transfer of 
heritable traits between species. Despite the enthusiasm of biotechnology companies, government and 
many scientists, it has run into serious public relations problems, because many NGOs and consumers 
believe it is not safe. UK supermarkets refused to stock any foodstuffs containing GM ingredients, and 
in 1998, the EU Commission imposed a de facto moratorium on new approvals of GM products 
(Lieberman and Gray 2006). In response to these pressures, the UK government delayed commercial 
development of GM food and crops pending a series of field trials.   
There is little doubt that the government’s preferred approach on this issue was sound science 
as no hazard had been observed in early US research. The government was well-disposed to GM crops 
because the global trade in biotechnology-related products was vast. The market within the EU alone 
was expected to be worth $100 billion by 2005 (Guardian 2002), and biotechnology companies in the 
UK employ around 20,000 people, contributing approximately £2 billion to the British economy, while 
worldwide, there are about 35 million hectares of land producing commercial GM crops. The 
government was, therefore, naturally keen to see the British biotechnology industry retain its lead in 
Europe.  
However, a major concern of environmental NGOs and consumer organizations was the 
anxiety that genetic modification of crops to make them insect-resistant might result in such traits 
escaping into the wild and endangering biodiversity—the geneflow problem. It was also feared that 
herbicide resistance would find its way into weed populations, which would then outcompete food 
crops. In addition, there were worries of direct harm to human health: the general public in Britain and 
Europe had been fed stories for several years by the media of Mad Cow Disease, salmonella in chicken, 
listeria in cheese and e-coli poisoning, and in such a climate, it was hardly surprising that news of GM 
or “Frankenstein” food development raised further safety concerns about food. In addition, there was 
public unease about the idea of scientists meddling with nature. The unpopularity of GMOs with the 
public was also due to the predatory actions of biotechnology companies. The environmental journalist 
George Monbiot (2000: 253) claimed that by patenting genes, seeds and associated technologies, the 
biotechnology companies have “placed a padlock” on the food chain and could exercise complete 
control over what we eat.  
A number of organizations, including English Nature, the Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds, Friends of the Earth, and Gene Watch called for a moratorium on the growing of GMOs for a 
period of up to five years. The government’s response was to establish a Cabinet Committee to deal 
with biotechnology matters, and in collaboration with the biotechnology industries concerned, to halt 
the commercial growing of herbicide resistant GM crops until scientifically-controlled field trials – 
“Farm Scale Evaluations” (FSE) scheduled to take place over four years - had been completed. Also, 
the government announced in 2002 that there would be a “Public Debate” on GM issues, consisting of 
three strands: 1) a science review; an economic review; and 3) a public consultation exercise called 
“GM Nation”, which involved nine foundation workshops each with 20 randomly chosen people to 
identify the issues for future public debate, followed by a series of public deliberative events where 
participants discussed the issues in small groups and reported back to plenary sessions. All participants 
in the events would be asked to return feedback questionnaires.  
The results of the FSE were that two of the three GM crops grown in the trials, oilseed rape 
and sugar beet, appeared to be more harmful to the environment than were conventional crops, and 
should not be grown in the UK, but that the third crop, GM maize, allowed the survival of more weeds 
and insects than did non-GM maize, and might be recommended for approval, though some scientists 
still had reservations (Royal Society 2003). The Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment, 
the main source of scientific advice for the regulation of GMOs, accepted the FSE report’s conclusions 
(ACRE 2004). However, the Environmental Audit Committee of the House of Commons questioned 
the reliability of the FSE’s findings, complaining that the maize trials were invalid because they 
applied the chemical atrazine, which was being phased out (House of Commons 2004: 1). Also, the 
committee questioned whether the GM industry had covertly influenced the results. Environmental 
NGOs pointed out that GM crops in the trials were only grown for one season in any one field, so 
incremental impacts of repeated growing could not be detected (Mayer 1999), and the issues of 
geneflow from GM crops to non-GM or organic crops and native flora, and the possible creation of 
“superweeds” and “superpests”, could not be resolved.    
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The results of the government’s Public Debate provided little comfort for the GM crop cause. 
The science panel’s review report found no scientific case for ruling out GM crops, but nor did it give 
them blanket approval, and after admitting gaps in its knowledge, it concluded that products submitted 
for approval need to be considered on a case-by-case basis (DTI 2003). The economic review report 
concluded that while GM crops could offer some benefits to farmers, any economic benefit to the UK 
was limited because of the narrow range of crops currently suited to UK conditions. The report on the 
public debate concluded that the public was unhappy about GM products, and that the more they knew 
about GM issues, the more their attitude hardened as they became more anxious about the risks 
involved.   
To summarise the government’s handling of the GM crop controversy, in early attempts to 
regulate GM products, the Government approached the introduction of these untried technologies by 
accepting the conventional risk assessment procedures familiar in the sound science approach. But 
increasingly, this policy became the target of vociferous campaigns by the green lobby and some of the 
media, urging a GM-free Britain. Also, the EU Commission imposed a moratorium on GM crops and 
foods. These pressures led the government to delay commercialization pending clarification of 
potential harm and product safety – in other words, to adopt a strong PP position. The response of the 
government to the issue of GM crops was thus different from its response to the issue of OPs, where it 
held on to its sound science approach.  The main reasons for the difference were twofold: first, unlike 
the OPs issue, the GM issue gained high political salience very quickly and was the subject of much 
media attention; second, unlike the OPs issue, the GM issue required a decision urgently, because of 
the need to clarify whether the biotech industry could be allowed to grow GM crops. 
 
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
Unlike the previous two case studies, which are on-going policy problems, BSE was a 
problem that had a clear beginning (1985, when BSE first began to appear in herds in Britain) and a 
clear end (1998, when the EU Commission allowed the resumption of exports of British beef). The 
BSE crisis led to what is generally viewed as a policy disaster, and an example of how sound science 
was mismanaged by ministers and officials in vainly attempting to regulate a new hazard: ‘This was a 
classic example of ‘no evidence of harm’ being misinterpreted as “evidence of no harm”’ (Harremoes, 
et al 2002: 191). At first, MAFF refused to adopt a precautionary stance, relying instead on sound 
science to provide evidence with which to make decisions, though interpreting that evidence to suit the 
political priorities of the government. But later the pressure for action became so strong that the 
government had little choice but to take (weak) precautionary action. The BSE issue had major 
repercussions in both domestic and EU politics, including the collapse of the British beef market, the 
mass slaughter of infected cattle, the banning of British beef exports to the EU by the Commission, a 
diplomatic crisis when Britain began a retaliatory policy of non-cooperation designed to paralyze EU 
business, and a lasting legacy of public distrust of government’s use of science. 
BSE is one of a group of neurological diseases known as transmissible spongiform 
encephalopathy’s (TSEs), which also include scrapie in sheep, and Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (CJD) 
and kuru in humans. CJD normally occurs in only one case in two million persons per year throughout 
the world (Oldstone 1998: 165), and mostly strikes people over 65. Because of the randomness of 
where in the world it appears, and because of its unknown origin, it is called sporadic CJD. The 
symptoms of TSEs were found in cattle in the UK in 1985, and after research conducted by the Central 
Veterinary Laboratory of MAFF, it was confirmed in November 1986 that a new strain, BSE, did exist. 
Within two years, over 2,000 cases of BSE in cattle emerged in more than 200 herds (Oldstone 1998: 
163). The first account of this epidemic appeared in the journal Veterinary Record in October 1987 
(Wells et al 1987). Much later, in March 1996, the government’s new advisory committee on BSE, the 
Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee (SEAC), informed the Secretary of State for 
Health, Stephen Dorrell, of their latest findings: that a distinct variant of CJD had occurred in ten 
people in Britain over the previous 14 months and that a link between BSE and CJD could not be ruled 
out. Mr Dorrell immediately told the House of Commons about these findings, and a month later, the 
medical journal Lancet published a report of ten cases of a new variant of CJD in Britain.  The unusual 
feature of these cases was that the patients’ ages ranged from nineteen to thirty-nine, and the brain-
wave pathologies of these patients were found to be different from other patients with sporadic CJD. 
The CJD Surveillance Units decided that Britain had a new variant CJD: vCJD (Oldstone 1998: 166). 
Since 1990, 170 people have died in the UK from vCJD. 
For almost 10 years, the British Government and its scientific advisers insisted there was no 
risk from BSE to human health, or that any risk was so small that it could be said that there was no risk 
(Powell and Leiss 1997: 4). All that the government was prepared to do in the early stages of the 
problem was to take steps to control the spread of BSE in cattle; to encourage research into the possible 
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link with human health; and to set up committees to examine the evidence for such a link. However, in 
the face of the growing epidemic in cattle which was increasingly being reported in the media, senior 
officials at MAFF were concerned that difficult questions about its potential impact on human health 
would sooner or later be asked in Parliament, and that if some action was not taken by government they 
might be held responsible if it later emerged that BSE was transmissible to humans (Phillips et al 2000,  
volume 3, paragraph 5.41c).  
Accordingly, acting on the advice of the Southwood Committee’s 1988 report, the 
government introduced measures to make BSE a notifiable human disease; to slaughter affected cattle; 
to ban ruminant-derived meat and bone meal, and to provide compensation, which was set at 50% of 
the value of each confirmed case. In 1989, a ban was imposed on specified bovine offals, which 
included brains, spinal cord and other organs) in the human food chain, and in 1990, full compensation 
payments were authorised for farmers. In 1995, accepting the advice of SEAC, the government 
announced its decision to stop the use of bovine vertebral column in the manufacture of mechanically 
recovered meat. In 1996, the 30-month Slaughter Scheme was introduced, whereby all cattle over 30-
months at the time of slaughter did not enter either the human or animal food chains. These measures 
were, according to one commentary, ‘not designed to eradicate the BSE agent, but only to diminish the 
risk’, and they were not introduced earlier, ‘not because of their immediate costs, but because of their 
liability to undermine the government’s reassurance message’ (Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2002: 
175; 177).  
However, the government was accused of dividing the scientific community into an in-group and 
an out-group, and favouring the former group over the latter group, which it marginalised. Richard 
Lacey, who had experience of serving on the MAFF Veterinary Products Committee and had been a 
consultant to the WHO since 1984, was convinced from the beginning that BSE could be passed on to 
humans, but after appearing before the House of Commons Select Committee on Agriculture, his 
evidence was dismissed as being ‘sensationalist’; having ‘lost touch with the real world’; and a mixture 
of ‘science and science fiction’ (Rowell 2003: 42). As the Phillips report pointed out,  
 
The official line that the risk of transmissibility [of BSE] was remote and that beef was safe 
did not recognize the possible validity of any other view. Dissident scientists tended to be 
treated with derision, and driven into the arms of the media and to exaggerated statements of 
risk. Thus views expressed on risk became polarised. Dispute replaced debate (Phillips et al 
2000, volume 1: 234).   
 
Membership of the government’s advisory committees reflected and perpetuated this division, in 
that successive BSE committees were staffed by ‘respectable scientists’, while those scientists who 
held more radical views were excluded. Steven Dealler (1996: 35), an independent research scientist, 
claimed that ‘direct information about BSE was not reaching the medical literature and that what we 
were hearing was what MAFF was allowing us to hear’.  
Van Zwanenberg and Millstone (2002: 174) claimed that ‘the government’s policy was not 
precautionary: its primary objective was rather one of trying to diminish, as far as possible, the short-
term adverse impact of BSE on the profitability of the food industry and the level of public 
expenditure’. However, our view is that in taking the above measures, the government’s measures had 
all the hallmarks of a weak PP – i.e. not banning the consumption  
of beef (which would have been a strong PP policy), but taking steps to reduce the risk of BSE 
spreading more widely, and contaminating human food.  
 
Discussion 
 
The government’s position was different in each of the three cases: a sound science stance on 
the OP issue; a strong PP stance on the GM crop issue; and a weak PP on the BSE issue. For some 
commentators, the cases would confirm their judgement that the British government’s preferred and 
default position is always the sound science stance; that it is inherently hostile to the PP; and that it is 
drawn reluctantly down the path of the PP (and preferably the weak PP rather than the strong PP) only 
when subjected to overwhelming pressure from public opinion or the EU. Our view, however, is that 
the British government is not hostile to the PP in principle, though neither is it committed to it in 
principle. Rather it regards the PP as one of several relevant principles to be taken into account when 
dealing with difficult environmental issues. As Jordan and O’Riordan (1995: 71) put it, ‘precaution is 
now one of a number of principles which the UK government identifies as the foundations for its 
environmental policy’. Analysis of the circumstances in a particular case will determine how heavily 
weighted the PP is in the government’s mind.  
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On the issue of OPs, the circumstances of the case were that the necessary precautionary steps 
should be taken by users of OPs, not by the government; that relatively few people were exposed to 
risk; that to ban OPs would lead to the use of other substances for sheep dipping which could seriously 
harm water quality in rivers; and that the issue had only intermittently high political salience. 
Accordingly, a sound science response was more appropriate than a PP approach (either weak or 
strong). On the issue of GM crops, the circumstances of the case were that although GM technology 
was extremely important for the British economy, GM crops potentially affected human health and the 
natural environment on a massive scale; that there were overwhelming pressures from environmental 
groups, the public, and the EU for a ban on the commercialisation of GM crops; that such a ban would 
not create significant hardship for consumers in the short term; and that sound science investigations 
would take a considerable time to complete. Accordingly, a strong PP was more appropriate than either 
a weak PP or a sound science approach. On the issue of BSE, the circumstances of the case were that, 
as the link between BSE and CJD/vCJD gradually became evident through sound science research, and 
as pressure mounted from other countries’ boycotts of UK beef exports, the government took 
successive, if limited, precautionary steps to reduce the level of public exposure to the risk of 
contracting the illness. It judged that a weak PP was more appropriate than either a strong PP or a 
sound science approach. Some commentators argue that the Conservative government’s comparatively 
weak PP approach to the BSE issue had sectional causes, in its close relationship with the farming 
industry (Grant 1997: 343; Cannon 1987: 395), and ideological causes, because it ‘was ideologically 
committed to deregulation’ (Bartlett 1999: 237). But if so, such causes were only two factors among 
many other considerations that the government had to balance.  
In short, our finding is that the British government’s approach to the PP is not, as is often 
portrayed,  innate suspicion and automatic opposition, but that the PP offers one response (or rather 
two, a weak and a strong response) among several other alternative responses to the issues of 
environmental policy, which it will consider when assessing all the circumstances of particular cases. 
Such a finding not only contradicts a caricature of British environmental policy, but it also shows how 
the British approach is much more in line with other countries’ approaches. Let us explain. Another 
caricature is the contrast that is often drawn between the EU as a proponent of the PP, and the USA as 
an opponent of it. Sunstein (2005: 13-14) rehearses this caricature as follows:  
 
it has become standard to say that with respect to risks Europe and the United States can be 
distinguished along a single axis: Europe accepts the precautionary principle and the US 
does not. On this view, Europeans attempt to build a ‘margin of safety’ into public decisions, 
taking care to protect citizens against risks that cannot be established with certainty. By 
contrast, Americans are reluctant to take precautions, requiring clear evidence of harm in 
order to justify regulation (cf. Konig 2000: 126, 131; Whiteside 2006: 61; Graham and Hsia 
2002: 373). 
 
But as Wiener and Rogers (2002: 317, 335, 342) point out:  
 
Sometimes the EU is more precautionary than the US (such as regarding hormones in beef), 
while sometimes the US is more precautionary than the EU (such as regarding mad cow 
disease in blood). Thus neither the EU nor the US can claim to be categorically ‘more 
precautionary’ than the other. The real pattern is complex and risk-specific…differences in 
relative precaution depend more on the context of the particular risk than on broad 
differences in national regulatory regimes…Neither the US nor the EU has taken a 
consistent position about its own stance. Each has been sometimes precautionary, sometimes 
not…Each actor has been more precautionary than the other as to some risks and less 
precautionary as to others (cf. Sunstein 2005: 14, 20, 29, 33-34; Whiteside 2006: 61-70). 
 
The truth is that the US makes use of the PP in certain circumstances, and the EU declines to use 
it in certain circumstances. Indeed, as Sunstein (2005: 21, 34) notes, ‘Every nation is precautionary 
about some risks but not others…Simply as a logical matter, societies, like individuals, cannot be 
highly precautionary with respect to all risks. Each society and each person must select certain risks for 
special attention…the selectivity of precautions is not merely an empirical fact; it is a conceptual 
inevitability’. This selective approach is exactly the same as that adopted by the UK – its employment 
of the PP is entirely issue-specific – circumstances determine if and how it deploys the PP in any given 
case.  
If this discussion of the British government’s use of the PP appears to be over-sympathetic to the 
government, we do have one critical observation – that in all three cases, there was a lack of 
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transparency on the part of the government, which seemed more concerned to reassure the public than 
to share its information. For instance, in the OPs case, repeated assurances were given that if farmers 
used OP sheep dip in accordance with the manufacturers’ instructions, they should be safe from harm; 
yet not all the relevant data was made public by the government, and the peer review system was 
exclusive to the government and industry. In the case of GM crops, dissident scientists were effectively 
gagged, and membership of the government’s advisory committees was skewed towards biotechnology 
interests. As for BSE, the government spent 10 years reassuring the public that BSE could not cross the 
species barrier from cattle to humans, while restricting relevant data to research institutes and creating 
a distinction between in-group and out-group scientists.   
This criticism suggests that the British government failed to appreciate one of the most 
compelling benefits of the PP – its democracy-enhancing qualities. As Feintuck (2005: 398) argues, the 
PP ‘has a potentially crucial ideological function as an instrument for ensuring that collective, often 
non-economic, democratically-derived interests are given due prominence in processes which may 
otherwise be dominated and/or damaged by economic interests and related technological imperatives 
claiming legitimacy through “science” or scientific certainty’.  
 
 Conclusion 
 
Many critics have accused the British government of taking an opportunistic approach to the 
PP – a charge that implies it was unprincipled. But our interpretation of three important cases of 
environmental policy-making in the UK is that the government applied the meta-principle of 
circumstance to judge whether to invoke the PP, and if so, which PP to choose, the weak or the strong. 
In this respect, the UK is similar to most other countries, in that their commitments to the precautionary 
principle (PP) are also circumstantial – they apply the PP selectively. The implication of this analysis is 
that stereotypical characterisations of national styles of environmental regulation may be misleading, 
masking the extent to which countries respond to environmental crises on a case-by-case basis – i.e. in 
unpredictable and idiosyncratic, rather than deterministic, ways.  
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